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Commentary

Antitrust and the Costs of StandardSetting:
A Commentary on Teece & Sherry
t

Mark R. Patterson

Professor David Teece and Edward Sherry make a valuable
contribution to the literature on patents and standards.1 Much
of that literature treats the conduct of the patentee during the
standard-setting process as the key factor in evaluating the
propriety of enforcement of its patent. 2 Teece and Sherry, by
contrast, call attention to two other important factors. First,
they show that even where the patentee has arguably distorted
the standard-setting process, society may benefit from reduced
costs of standardization.3 Second, they point out that members
of standard-setting organizations can also have incentives to
4
engage in anticompetitive behavior.
This Commentary contends, however, that Teece and
Sherry overstate the significance of these two effects. With
regard to the first, they neglect several factors that reduce the
cost reductions that patentees' inventions make possible and
make it unclear whether the patentee is in fact responsible for
the reductions that do result. With regard to the second, they
emphasize the possibility of anticompetitive actions by
standard-setting organizations without either demonstrating
t

Copyright © 2003 by Mark R. Patterson, Professor of Law, Fordham
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School. I am grateful for helpful comments from Jill Fisch, Ed Sherry, Steve
Thel, and the participants at the Symposium on The Interface Between
Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law at the University of Minnesota
Law School.
1. See generally David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, StandardsSetting
and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Patenting Industry Standards, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 897, 945-46 (2001).
3. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1931-34, 1987-94.
4. See id. at 1929-31.

1995

1996

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1995

that such actions are likely or providing a test for determining
whether they have occurred. 5 This response elaborates on my
previous work addressing these issues. 6 That work anticipates
some of Teece and Sherry's points, but their article suggests
improvements to the analysis. 7 Like Teece and Sherry's work,
mine does not focus on the conduct of the patentee, but rather
on the market effects of the patentee's invention. In another
respect, though, our emphases are different. My focus is on the
demand for standards, 8 while Teece and Sherry focus on their
capacity for reducing costs, both private and social. 9 Because
the demand for standards is generally derived from their
capacity for reducing costs, the two approaches are often
similar, but an emphasis on costs illuminates some additional
issues.
Part I below begins with a brief discussion of the
differences between the demand-oriented and cost-oriented
approaches. Part II discusses four possible objections to Teece
and Sherry's cost-oriented approach. Part III then addresses
Teece and Sherry's suggestion that standard-setting organizations may behave anticompetitively. This Commentary
concludes that both patentees
and standard-setting
organizations contribute to the benefits of standardized
products, and that antitrust law should seek to preserve the
incentives of both.
It is worth noting at this point that the principles
underlying the arguments made here are to a large extent
those of patent law, rather than antitrust law. That is, they
derive from the need to provide sufficient incentives for
innovation, rather than from the goal of promoting competition
5. Teece and Sherry do cite a case in which there was anticompetitive
conduct in a standard-setting organization, but that case arose in a very
different context. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1919 n.21 (citing Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495-99 (1988)). Most

importantly, it involved the manipulation of the standard-setting process by a
single member of the standard-setting organization, rather than
anticompetitive conduct by the organization collectively. In that respect, the
case suggests more concern regarding the manipulation of the process by
patentee members of a standard-setting organization than anticompetitive
action by the organization as a whole.
6. See Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and
Intellectual Property, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043, 1055-56, 1058-64 (2002).

7. Most significantly, it prompts a more explicit consideration of the
costs of standard-setting. See infra text accompanying notes 40-50.
8. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 1056-78.
9. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1931-34.
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in the shorter term. Moreover, that is so despite the fact that
this Commentary argues that antitrust law should impose
some limits on patent law as it currently exists.' 0 The reason
for this apparent inconsistency is that it is not clear that patent
law as it currently exists advances its own goals in the
standard-setting context." That is why antitrust has stepped
into some of the cases. As is often the case, though, antitrust is
not perfectly suited to redressing flaws in patent law. 12
I. THE COSTS OF AND DEMAND FOR STANDARDIZATION
My previous work contends that whether a patentee whose
invention is incorporated in an industry standard is entitled to
licensing revenues depends on the source of demand for the
standardized product. 13 If the demand for the standardized
product derives from the technical benefits of the invention
rather than from the standardization, the patentee is entitled
to profit from the demand that its invention creates. But it
may be the benefits of standardization,
such as
interoperability, that create demand for the standardized
product. In that case, there may be little or no demand for the
particular means-the invention-by which the benefits of
standardization are achieved, and the patentee is not entitled
to revenues from demand to which it does not contribute.
Although Teece and Sherry do not explicitly propose an
alternative approach, their Article suggests that they support a
test based on whether the patentee's invention reduces the
costs of complying with the standard. 14 This may appear to be
a significantly different test. After all, cost is generally a
supply-side consideration, rather than a demand-side one. In
the standards context, however, this is true only in part.
Most often, the relevant consumer of a standard, and of an
invention that is incorporated in it, is the manufacturer of the
products that comply with the standard. The relevant demand,

10.
11.

See infra text accompanying notes 54-68.
Most importantly, to the extent that patent law allows patentees to

appropriate the innovative contributions of standard-setting organizations, it
fails to provide those organizations with the incentive to innovate that is the
motivating goal of patent law. See infra text accompanying notes 45-68.
12. I am currently addressing this problem more generally in another
article. See Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust and the Quality of Intellectual
Property Law (draft on file with author).
13. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 1056-78.
14. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1931-34.
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therefore, is a derived demand. 15 That is, the manufacturer's
demand is derived from that of the ultimate buyers of the
standardized product. 16 The manufacturer's demand derives
either from the fact that the standard/invention will make its
product more attractive to the ultimate buyers or from the fact
that the standard/invention will reduce its costs of
manufacturing the product.
In the latter case, where the manufacturer's demand is
derived from the ability of a standard or an invention to reduce
costs, Teece and Sherry's cost-based approach is similar to a
demand-based one. They emphasize, however, that the cost
reduction itself can be a benefit to society. 17 In that respect,
their focus is not confined to the effect of the cost reductions on
demand. For that reason, they apparently favor allowing
patentees to charge fees for their inventions that are greater
than the benefits to manufacturers, so long as social costs are
reduced. 18 Some objections to this approach are discussed
below.
Interestingly, Teece and Sherry's focus on social costs,
rather than private costs and benefits, brings to the fore certain
issues that are less prominent when one focuses on demand. 19
The cost-based approach is somewhat more naturally suited to
antitrust, with its emphasis on competition, than to patent law,
with its focus on reward to the patentee. This is rather
surprising given that Teece and Sherry's article generally
emphasizes the benefits that patentees provide in the

15. This point is made both in my previous work and by Teece and Sherry.
Patterson, supra note 6, at 1058; Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1928.
16. A "derived demand" for a factor of production, such as a standard, is a
demand "derived from the demand for the final good that the factor cooperates in producing." MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 104 (David

W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986).
17. Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1931-34.
18. See id. at 1931-34, app. at 1989-94.
19. The reverse is also true, in that a demand-oriented approach
addresses other issues. For example, manufacturers may want to incorporate
inventions in their products because the inventions provide technical benefits
that are unrelated to cost reductions. A particular invention may be only one
of several, equally expensive means of complying with a standard, but the
invention may provide other benefits that the manufacturer's customers would
demand. In that case, the invention would provide no reductions in cost,
private or social, but it would nevertheless create a demand on the part of the
manufacturers. Thus, the cost-based approach of Teece and Sherry does not

come into play here, and I will not address this issue further. See Patterson,
supra note 6, at 1064-73.
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standard-setting context. 20 The explanation lies in a more
complete exploration of the contributions of standard-setting to
social costs.
II. PROBLEMS WITH A COST-ORIENTED APPROACH
The sections below discuss four potential problems with a
cost-based approach like Teece and Sherry's. Two of these
problems, the more standard patent-law issues, are mentioned
by them. First, even where overall social costs are reduced, the
patentee's demand for royalties can impose a deadweight loss. 21
Although this is a necessary effect of patent law, there is
reason to think that it could be especially undesirable in the
standardization context. Second, the opportunity to reap
licensing fees can lead to rent-seeking behavior on the part of
potential patentees. 22 This is also a well-known effect of patent
law, but again the effect can be especially significant in the
standardization context.
Two other issues are not discussed by Teece and Sherry.
One is that the proper allocation of the reward for a reduction
in social costs is not as clear as they imply. Put simply, it often
will not be clear whether the patentee or the standard-setters
are more entitled to that reward. 23 Even if the standardsetting organization is not entitled to a patent for its efforts,
the economics of standard-setting are not so different from
those of the more typical innovation scenario. As a result, the
economic argument for rewarding the standard-setters may be
just as strong as the argument for rewarding the patentee.
Finally, Teece and Sherry treat the payments of royalties
by the manufacturers of standardized products to patentees as
a pure transfer. 24 Moreover, they appear to assume that the
payments are profits to the patentee; that is, they assume that
the payments do not compensate the patentee for any real costs
incurred. 25 That may be an accurate view of the facts in some
20.

In one sense, of course, this is not surprising at all, in that the benefits

that the patentee provides are often exactly those that reduce the (private and

social) costs of producing the standardized product. As discussed below,
though, it may be the case that the patentee's inventive activities themselves
impose social costs. See infra Parts II.A.2 & II.C.
21. See infra Part II.A.1.
22. See infra Part II.A.2.

23. See infra Part II.B.
24.
25.

Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1931-32, app. at 1989-94.
See id.
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standards contexts.
If so, though, it would not justify
conferring a reward on the patentee under the principles of
26
patent law.
A. STANDARD PATENT LAW PROBLEMS IN THE STANDARDS
CONTEXT

1. Deadweight Loss
Teece and Sherry make reference to the possibility of a
deadweight loss created by a patentee's demand for royalties,
but they apparently believe that this deadweight loss will be
small and not a significant concern. 27 The magnitude of the
deadweight loss is determined by the number of potential
buyers who are priced out of the market and the buyer surplus
that is thereby forgone. 28 In the usual case, the decisions of
individual buyers are more or less independent, so there is no
compelling reason to expect the loss to be either very small or
29
very large.
In the standardization context, though, where network
effects will contribute to demand, 30 the buyers' decisions are
likely to be interdependent. Indeed, they may follow a "tipping"
scenario. 3' If a buyer expects most of its competitors to submit
to the royalty payments, the buyer likely will do the same.
Conversely, if the buyer expects a significant number of its
competitors to decline to license, it may do so also. This might

26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1931 n.74, app. at 1992.
Actually, they say little about the deadweight loss, beyond mentioning that it
exists. This is somewhat surprising, given that the deadweight loss produced
by monopoly pricing is generally the primary objection to the monopoly. On
the other hand, the loss is generally viewed as an acceptable price to pay for
the benefits of innovation that patent law provides.
28. "Deadweight loss consists of two components: (1) the extent of the lost
satisfaction each consumer experiences who is unable to purchase a product
because of its higher, more monopolistic price, and (2) the number of
consumers who experience such loss." Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining
Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 564 (1996)
(citations omitted).
29. That is, in the usual case there is no particular reason to think that
buyer demand is likely to be distributed in any particular way, so that it is
difficult to make any predictions regarding the deadweight loss.
30. See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications
of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
31. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and StandardSetting Organizations,90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1896-97 (2002).
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lead to an all-or-none situation: Either demand will be more or
less uniformly high, or it will be uniformly low. In the latter
case, the patentee likely would lower its royalty rates or
otherwise make licensing more attractive so as to "tip" the
market to a uniformly high demand. The important point is
that to the extent that there are network effects that drive
demand, those effects derive from standardization, not from the
patentee's invention. That is, even buyers who otherwise
would prefer not to license the patentee's invention may feel
that it is necessary to do so to gain the benefits of
standardization. Patentees know this, of course, and some
appear specifically to exploit it. For example, Rambus Inc.
threatened that those who challenged its patents would have to
pay a higher royalty than those who did not, perhaps seeking to
create sufficient32 early acceptance of the standard at issue to
cause "tipping."
One might respond that even if the buyers are forced by
network-effect-augmented demand to pay the patentee's
royalties, so long as they do in fact pay, there is no deadweight
loss. Although that is true, the magnitude of the resulting
payments may be considerable. 33 That is not in itself a
problem, at least if one takes a total-welfare approach to the
analysis, but it contributes to the possibility of rent-seeking,
the subject of the next section.
2. Patentee Rent-Seeking
Teece and Sherry also make reference to the possibility of
patentee rent-seeking, but they do not assess the likely
magnitude of this problem. 34 The typical rent-seeking problem
32. See Mike Magee, Rambus Threatens Non-Compliant Dramurai,THE
REGISTER (Sept. 15, 2000), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/archive/
14279.html.
Rambus says that it is willing to license its IP for non compatible
platforms on reasonable, fair and consistent terms. That may be the
carrot but the stick is that "those companies that decide to litigate
will pay higher royalty rates" and "Rambus may not license those
companies that litigate and lose."
Id.
33. See, e.g., Tony Smith, Rambus' "Very High" DDR Royalty Revealed,
THE REGISTER (May 3, 2001) (reporting that Rambus was charging a royalty of
3.5% of sales for rights to patents that had been incorporated in a standard, as
compared with a 0.75% rate for some of its other patents), at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/archive/ 18706.html.
34. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1933-34, 1934 n.77, app. at 1993
n.236.
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in the patent context occurs when several inventors race to be
35
the first to discover an invention and receive a patent.
Because only one will receive a patent, the efforts of the others
are wasted, consuming societal resources without a societal
benefit. 36
This problem seems likely to be more severe in the
standard-setting context than in others for two reasons. First,
there are potentially two races. Inventors may race to acquire
a patent on an invention that could be useful for
standardization, and then patentees may race, in the sense
that they may make efforts, to have their patented inventions
adopted as industry standards. As a result, although in the
usual case the race ends when a patent is received, here the
race can continue until a standard is selected.
Second, the all-or-none network character of the
standardized market makes winning the race even more
important. 37 In the usual patent race, even the winner of the
race
may
face
competition
from
other
products.
Standardization, however, effectively eliminates competition by
creating a compelling incentive to adopt the standard
approach. 38 Consequently, the winner of the race receives
assistance from the network demand effects in reaping a
maximum reward from its efforts. 39 This increases the
incentive for race participants to direct their efforts at winning
the race.

B. WHO REDUCES THE SOCIAL COSTS OF STANDARDIZED
PRODUCTS?

Teece and Sherry illustrate their analysis through a figure

35. The economic literature on patent races is surveyed in Jennifer F.
Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation:Research, Development, and Diffusion,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849 (Richard Schmalensee &

Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
36. See id. at 853-68.
37. See David Friedman, Standardsas IntellectualProperty:An Economic
Approach, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1994).
38.

See, e.g., Compl.

89, In re Rambus Inc.,

(No. 9302) (filed June 18,

2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/rambuscmp.htm (describing rapid industry adoption of new standardized technology and replacement of previous
technology).
39.

See id.

105 (explaining that, because of widespread commitment to a

JEDEC standard incorporating the technology of Rambus Inc, "it is not
economically feasible for the industry to attempt to alter or work around the
JEDEC standards in order to avoid payment of royalties to Rambus").
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that shows how a patented invention can reduce the cost of
compliance with a standard.40
Their figure represents
conditions in a market that already includes the standard, and
therefore does not illustrate the contributions of the standardsetting organization to the reduction of social costs. When the
efforts of the standard-setting organization are considered
explicitly, the picture looks rather different.
Consider a typical standard directed at the interoperability
of products of various manufacturers. 4 1
In general,
interoperability does not require a standard.
Instead,
manufacturers could choose to produce their products according
to whatever designs they prefer, and then they could coordinate
among themselves later to achieve interoperability.
For
example, pairs of manufacturers could devise interfaces to
allow their products to work together. An example of this
approach to interoperability is the use of emulators that
allow
42
Apple computers to run DOS and Windows programs.
The reason this approach is not often used, and the reason
there is standardization, is that it is very expensive. It
potentially requires a negotiation and design effort for each
pair of products that need to work together. Standardization
allows interoperability to be achieved with only one negotiation
and design effort, which greatly reduces costs. The standardsetting effort, however, also imposes costs on the participants,
as illustrated in Figure 1:

40.
41.

Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, app. at 1992 fig.1.
See Patterson, supra note 6, at 1069-73. So-called performance

standards present different issues. See id.

42.

See Operating Systems Solutions: Running Windows or Linux/UNIX

Software

on a Macintosh

and Running

MacOS

on Other

http://www.macwindows.com/emulator.html (last visited
(describing alternatives for such emulation).

Platforms,

Feb. 24, 2003)
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Pn ce

Q

Q,,

Quantity

Figure 1
In Figure 1, Cn is the cost of achieving interoperability
without standardization, and C. is the much lower cost of using
standardization. C. is the additional charge necessary to
43
recoup the costs of the standard-setting organization's efforts.
Although this cost is generally not paid directly, it is incurred
through payments to the organization or through the cost of
employees' work hours in the standard-setting effort. Thus, if
there is no patented invention at issue, the cost of achieving
interoperability is reduced from Cn to C,+C,,. Moreover, the
general approach of Figure 1 can be used to produce an
alternative version of Teece and Sherry's figure:

43.

It is possible that the total cost of the standardization effort would be

a fixed, quantity-independent amount. In that case, the per-unit C,,, shown in
Figure 1, would be lower at higher quantities. But it is also possible that the

cost of the effort would increase as higher volumes are expected, due to the
greater costs of coordinating the effort. Which of these possibilities is actually
the case is not important for the qualitative points made here, so C., is
represented in the figure as a quantity-independent cost.
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Price

2005

Deadweight loss

Cn

Potential cost savings of

Cp+R+C~s

standardization without
patentee's invention

Cp+R
Cu+C

Additional cost savings
/perhapsmade possible
by patentee's invention

Cp+cs,
CPF

Q,

Q,

Quantity

Figure 2
Figure 2 recreates Teece and Sherry's Figure 1, but adds
the cost of the standardization effort, C., to each of the three
cost measures in their figure. It is important to note that the
cost of the standardization effort is generally independent of
whether the standard incorporates a patented invention 44 and
of the royalty rate that the patentee establishes. Therefore, if
the patentee imposes a higher royalty rate, resulting in a
higher price and sales of fewer units, the additional cost per
unit required to compensate for the standardization effort
increases, to produce the same total compensation. Thus, the
effect of the patentee's royalties is amplified by the greater
costs per unit of the standard-setting, and the deadweight loss
is correspondingly greater.
Figure 2 does not purport to provide a precise
representation of the standardization "market" in any
particular instance, any more than does Teece and Sherry's
figure. The point of Figure 2 is simply to show that it is
necessary to provide compensation not only to the patentee but
also to the standard-setters. Moreover, it is not at all clear that
44. This is true, at least, if the standard-setting organization is unaware
of the patent.
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the compensation appropriate for the patentee will be the
greater one, because both the effort of invention and that of
45
standard-setting can, but need not, be significant.
There are two ways in which incorporation of this
consideration results in an analysis different from Teece and
Sherry's. First, as described above, 46 the requirement that
"royalties" be provided not just to the patentee but also to the
standard-setters means that the deadweight loss, as Figure 2
shows, is greater than they describe. As they state, it is still an
empirical question whether that loss will outweigh whatever47
cost savings are made available by the patented invention,
but it makes it more likely that the loss will predominate.
Second, if it is possible that the standard-setters will be
unable to recoup their costs, they may choose not to engage in
the standard-setting effort at all, and society may be forced to
forgo the cost savings from that effort. In Figure 2, the cost
CP+R+C,, is nearly as high as the cost C n of achieving
interoperability without a standard. If CP+R+C, is expected to
exceed C., the standard-setting organization will simply not
engage in the standard-setting effort. This possibility may
seem implausible, but statements from standard-setting
organizations indicate that considerable resources can be
expended to deal with patent issues. 48 Exactly this concern
was raised by the director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition
in connection with the agency's recent action against Rambus
Inc. 49 Furthermore, the fact that in some of the cases potential
45. The costs incurred by the standard-setting organization may include
not just the administrative effort of reaching agreement on a standard, but
also the technical effort to discover an appropriate technical solution. See
Friedman, supra note 37, at 1122 ("In such cases, the availability and quality
of the standard may depend greatly on the reward provided, or not provided,
by intellectual property law."). Note also that although Teece and Sherry
seem to say that patentees incur no real costs in creating their inventions,
that is not generally correct, an issue taken up in the next section. See infra
Part II.C (discussing potential inventor social costs).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
47. Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, app. at 1990-92.
48. See Daniel J. Weitzner, Supplemental Comments, Joint Roundtables
on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the KnowledgeBased Economy: Standards and Intellectual Property: Antitrust Law and
Patent Landscapes (Nov. 6, 2002) (stating that "at least five of [the World
Wide Web Consortium's] technology design efforts suffered material delay or
required substantial investment of resources to resolve problems with
potentially blocking patents"), at http://www.w3.org/2002/11/15-doj-ftc-iprweitzner-suppl.html.
49. The FTC's press release regarding that case said, "The conduct at
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licensees have refused to pay the royalties demanded by
patentees, and instead have risked patent infringement
50
litigation, suggests that opt-out may be a real problem.
To be sure, if the standard-setting organization knew of the
existence of the patent, it could perhaps adopt an alternative
unpatented standard, resulting in cost C,+CQ,, rather than forgo
a standard entirely. The problem that has arisen in the cases,
though, is that the organization may not know which
approaches are patented until after the standard is chosen.5 '
In fact, Teece and Sherry suggest that this is desirable. 52 They
argue that choosing an unpatented standard may result in
greater social costs, implying that society benefits if the
patentee keeps its patent secret until the organization is locked
into the patented standard.5 3 That may be true ex post the
standardization effort, but if ex ante the organization does not
know which standards are patented, or what royalties may be
demanded for those that are, it may choose not to set a
standard. In that case, society would lose the potential benefits
of the standard-setting process.
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that it will be clear what
approach will best minimize social costs. Regardless, from the
perspective of patent law, if not antitrust law, a focus on social
costs rather than private ones is beside the point. Patent law is
intended to provide a return to the patentee, not to maximize
social benefits, except indirectly and approximately. 54 Thus, it
issue here has done substantial harm to important technology markets, and
threatens to undermine participation in industry standard-setting activities
more generally." Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Complaint Against Rambus,
Inc.: Deception of Standard-Setting Organization Violated Federal Law (June
19, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/rambus.htm (quoting
Joseph J. Simons, Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition).
50. See Smith, supra note 33 (reporting that several memory
manufacturers had refused to accept Rambus's royalty demands).
51. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
52. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, app. at 1989-94.
53. Id. app. at 1991. They suggest that the patentee may be willing to
negotiate a lower royalty, so that CI+R :C .. Id. at 1990-91. This may not be
the case if the standard-setting organization is already locked in to its selected
standard. See id. at 1991 (noting that one would expect the patentee to
moderate its demands "at least when the royalty rates are negotiated ex ante
(prior to the adoption of the standard)"). Lock-in can be a serious problem in
the standards context. See Compl. $ 105-09, In re Rambus Inc., (No. 9302)
(filed June 18, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/rambuscmp.htm (describing lock-in conditions).
54. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy
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is appropriate to first determine the return that is appropriate
under patent law, which depends on the demand for the
patentee's invention. Consider Figure 3:

Price
Equal total royalties

Cj+R ,

Cj+R
C +R*

C, CP---

DemandD,(P)
Demand Dj(P)

Qi

QP

Q,

Quantity

Figure 3
In this figure, D. is the demand for the product with the
standard, which incorporates the patented invention; Di is the
demand for the product with the patentee's invention, but
without standardization; and D. is the demand for the product
with neither invention nor standard. The cost C, of the product
with the invention alone is assumed to be the same as the cost
CP of standardization using the patented invention. In most of
the cases in this area, it appears that although there may be
some demand for the invention without the standard, it is
compliance with the standard, and the interoperability that the
standard provides, that produces the greater increase in

behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts."'); Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599

(Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The encouragement of investment-based risk is the
fundamental purpose of the patent grant .... "), modified on other grounds,
771 F 2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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demand. 55 This is the condition represented in the figure.
In the absence of standardization, the patentee could
maximize its profits by charging the royalty R, for a total cost
of C+R, which would provide the profits shown in the upward
hatched rectangle. To allow the patentee to charge a royalty R.
based on the demand for the standard D8 would be to give it a
return on the efforts of the standard-setter, thus conferring a
windfall, at least if the invention did not provide any benefits
specifically related to standardization.5 6 Instead, the royalty to
which the patentee is entitled can be derived by determining
what royalty will produce the same return in the standardized
context, where demand is D., as the return the patentee could
have achieved in the non-standardized context, with demand
Di. This is represented in the figure as R*, which produces a
total cost of C,+R*, providing the profits shown in the
downward hatched rectangle.
My previous article argued that this approach is consistent
57
with current patent doctrine, at least in the damages context.
It also proposed a number of principles to aid in making this
determination, and imposed on the patentee several burdens,
both substantive and procedural.5 8 The imposition of those
burdens derived from the view that there is no a priori
55. Even in Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Soundview Technologies, Inc., 157 F.
Supp. 2d 180 (D. Conn. 2001), where the patentee alleged that an industry
trade association was the vehicle for an antitrust "conspiracy to fix prices for

patent licenses," id. at 182, the demand for the invention was the result of an
FCC-established standard, id. at 181. On the other hand, in the Unocal case,

the invention at issue was directed at improved performance, rather than
interoperability, and the standard was also performance-based. See Union Oil

Co. of Cal. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 991-93 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In
such a case, where alternative means of achieving the standard-mandated
performance level exist, at least theoretically, the demand could be viewed as
specifically for the invention. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 1069-73. In its
recent complaint against Unocal, however, the FTC has alleged that the
standard at issue would not have been adopted had Unocal's patent position
been known. Compl.
5, In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., (No. 9305) (filed Mar. 4,

2003).
56.

If the invention contributes to the success of the standard, the issue is

more complicated, as is discussed in my previous article. Patterson, supra
note 6, at 1069-73.
57. Id. at 1047-51.
58. Substantively, I argued that the patentee should be entitled to
royalties for the use of its invention in a standard only if the standard-setting
organization could not have chosen an alternative that did not incorporate the
invention. Id. at 1058-61. Procedurally, I argued that the burden should be
on the patentee to prove the absence of such an alternative, at least if the
patentee was a member of the standard-setting organization. Id. at 1061.
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principle to use in determining which is more entitled to the
reward, the standard-setting body that engaged in a
collaborative decision-making process to select a means of
achieving interoperability, or the patentee that engaged in a
research process to discover a means of solving a particular
technical problem.
Indeed, it is possible that even with application of this
approach, the incentive for standard-setting is currently too
low. That is, it is possible that those who contribute to the
work of standard-setting organizations do not currently receive
a sufficient return on their contributions to provide the socially
optimal amount of standard-setting. This would be most likely
in a case in which only some of the manufacturers of a
standardized product participated in the standard-setting
activity, and thus bore its costs. 59 In that case, those
manufacturers who did not participate could free-ride on the
others' standard-setting investment, and could charge a lower
price for the standardized product, thus making it impossible
for the standard-setters to recoup their investments. 60 To avoid
this possibility, it might be desirable to grant standard-setting
organizations some sort of intellectual property protection, or to
provide them with some other sort
of legal protection that
61
enables them to recoup their costs.
One might, however, reject the view that standard-setters
are entitled to returns on their efforts. One might instead take
the view, which is a reasonable one in light of current patent
law, that the patentee, and only the patentee, is entitled to
royalties, simply by virtue of the fact of the incorporation of its
patented invention in the standard. After all, regardless of
what one thinks of the abstract entitlement of the standardsetting organization, the organization receives no patent on its
59. There may also be benefits to participating in the standard-setting
activity. For example, employees who participate in such activities may gain
technical knowledge, thus benefiting their employers. And those
manufacturers that participate may gain knowledge of the likely results of the
standard-setting activity before those that do not, thus giving them a firstmover advantage.
60. Referring back to Figure 1, those who do not participate in the
standard-setting effort could charge C., thus making it impossible for the
standard-setters to charge C.+C,., the price needed to recoup C.., the cost of the
standard-setting effort.
61. For example, one could provide the organization with freedom from
antitrust liability when negotiating with patentees. See infra Part III. One
might even permit the organization to restrict the benefits of its negotiating
effort to those who participated in its standard-setting effort.
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work. It is useful to consider, though, just how contingent
patent law's current allocation of rights is in this context. In
several respects, patent law in this area seems more a product
of oversight than considered choices, providing little principle
to support the current allocation of rights in the standards
context.
First, the patent law provisions that prevent standardsetting organizations from receiving patents for their standardsetting activities relate more to formal requirements than to
underlying principles. It is probably true that standard-setting
organizations themselves do not generally create the technical
inventions that are incorporated in their standards, but an
organization could perhaps receive a patent on the use of an
invention to achieve interoperability. Although this topic
62
seems not to have been explored in depth in the literature,
there are presumably two patent-law requirements that could
present problems here. First, the collaborative and sometimes
fluid nature of the standard-setting process may make it
63
difficult to determine the inventor or inventors of a standard.
Second, if the claim were not to the technical invention per se,
interoperability),
but to its use as a standard (e.g., to achieve
64
obvious.
as
viewed
be
might
the invention
Only the latter of these requirements goes to the heart of
the incentive rationale for patent protection, and it is likely
that at least some standards would be determined to be
nonobvious. The point here, however, is less to argue for the
patentability of standards than simply to suggest that a
reliance on patent law for the entitlement of patentees in this
context is not entirely convincing. There are benefits to
treating standards, at least in economic terms, as a form of
intellectual property and to recognizing that the contributions
of standard-setting organizations and patentees are similar. 65

62.

David Friedman has, however, suggested the possibility of patent

protection for standards. Friedman, supra note 37, at 1129.
63. Improper identification of the inventors of the subject matter of a
patent application can be sufficient to invalidate a patent, 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)

(2000), but in the standard-setting process, public information may be mixed
with the suggestions of various individuals from various organizations in a
manner difficult to reconcile with a precise identification of the inventors.

Challenges to the validity of a standards patent could be frequent and difficult
to resolve.
64. See id. § 103(a) (stating that "[a] patent may not be obtained if... the

subject matter as a whole would have been obvious").
65.

Patterson, supra note 6, at 1078-80.
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More support for this view can be found in the patent law
concept of prior users' rights. A prior user's right is a defense
to patent infringement for one who used the invention before
the patentee's creation of the invention or before its filing of a
patent application. 66 Depending on specific requirements, such
rights might be available if a standard were adopted before
claims were made for an invention that was required for that
standard.
Although the United States does not provide
generally for prior users' rights, other countries do provide for
such rights. 67 In addition, United States law does provide such
rights in certain circumstances for methods "of doing or
conducting business." 68 The question whether a particular
approach to standardization should be viewed as a method of
doing business will not be addressed here. The point again is
simply to suggest that patent doctrine is not so clearly, or so
unassailably, on the side of the patentee in standards disputes.

C. Do INVENTORS INCUR REAL SOCIAL COSTS?
When Teece and Sherry discuss the social costs of using a
patented invention to achieve standardization, they include in
those social costs only the cost of practicing the invention, not
the patent license fees. 69 They treat the license fees as a simple
transfer, and state that they reflect real cost savings. 70 This
appears to assume that the patentee's actual social costs of
creating the invention are zero. That would be possible if the
patentee came across the invention in the course of some other
activity, without incurring any extra costs. In that case,
though, we could hardly say that patent law was serving its
purpose by allowing the inventor to profit. Instead, it would be
a miscalculation-perhaps a necessary one, given the nature of
patent law, but a miscalculation nonetheless.
When a patentee demands royalties for the use of its
invention, the usual assumption is that those royalties enable
the inventor to recoup its investment in innovation. Indeed,
that is the purpose of the royalties; they are not intended as a
reward, but as compensation. To make this point more explicit,
consider that the patentee's royalties could serve any of three
66. See Keith M. Kupferschmid, Prior User Rights: The Inventor's Lottery
Ticket, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 213, 216 (1993).
67.

See id. at 248.

68. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3).
69. Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, app. at 1991-93.
70. Id.
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functions: to compensate for real and socially valuable costs of
inventive activity; 71 to compensate for real, but socially
undesirable costs of rent-seeking behavior; or to provide
payments where the patentee had in fact incurred no real
costs. 72 These possibilities are not equal with regard to the
purposes of patent law.
In the second case, real costs have been incurred, but at
least some of them are wasted. This includes, of course, the
classic concern regarding patent races that several inventors
will seek to be the first to create the invention, resulting in a
wasteful duplication of effort. In that sense, the "rent-seeking"
behavior may not be objectionable in itself,73 but becomes so
when it is duplicated by another. It is also possible that a
patentee may engage in other sorts of rent-seeking behavior,
either in the standard-setting process or in the market more
generally. In the standard-setting context, for example, the
patentee might devote considerable effort to keeping its patent
74
or patent application secret from the standard-setting body.
It is not a goal of patent law to provide compensation for any
75
sort of rent-seeking behavior.
In the third case, there are no real costs incurred by the
patentee. If the patentee incurred no costs in creating its
invention, however, there is no reason to compensate it. If
creating the invention is costless, no incentive is needed to
encourage the patentee to create. Patent law does not inquire
into this issue before awarding patents, because it would be an
impossible, or at least overly expensive, task to determine
which inventions require the patent incentive for their creation.
Nevertheless, if there were a class of patents that were granted
for costless inventions, we would not say that patent law is
76
serving its goals in granting monopolies for those inventions.

71.

This could include bearing the risk that the patentee's inventive effort

would not succeed.
72.

In a particular case, more than one of these purposes could be served,

of course.
73. Even the inventive activity of a single inventor with no competitors is
"rent-seeking" behavior, because the inventor seeks the "rents" that a patent
monopoly makes possible.
74. An extreme example of such efforts is alleged in the FTC's complaint
against Rambus. Compl.
39-88, In re Rambus Inc., (No. 9302) (filed June
18, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/rambuscmp.htm.

75. Cf. Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, app. at 1993 n.236 (stating that
resources consumed in rent-seeking must be considered as social costs).
76.

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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As stated above, a patent grant in such a case would be a
miscalculation, not a justification.
Only in the first case, where the patent royalties
compensate the costs of valuable inventive activity, is the real
goal of patent law served. In that case, however, the rectangle
labeled in Teece and Sherry's Figure 1 as "Real Resource Cost
Savings" does not in fact represent costs saved but costs
incurred. 77 That is, the costs saved by those selling the
standardized product are offset by the costs incurred by the
patentee in creating the invention. The royalty payments are a
transfer, as Teece and Sherry state, 78 but it is a transfer about
which we are indifferent, not one that reflects a savings in
79
social cost.
Perhaps Teece and Sherry treat the use of the patented
invention as a cost savings because they assume that the
patentee would have created the invention in any case, without
regard to the possibility of standardization. Therefore, they
may view the question simply as whether to take advantage of
the already-created
invention to reduce
subsequent
manufacturing costs. But this proves too much. If the patentee
would in fact have created the invention anyway-that is, if the
possible rewards from standardization were not part of the
inventor's incentive calculus-then there is no reason for
society to compensate the inventor for profits from
standardization. This was the point of the discussion in the
previous section regarding whether the demand that allows the
patentee to charge royalties is truly demand for the invention
or is instead demand for standardization. 80 If the patentee is
permitted to charge for the benefits of standardization, society
incurs a deadweight loss to provide royalties where no
incentive to create was necessary.8 '
77. Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, app. at 1992 fig.1.
78. Id. at 1931.
79. This is true despite the fact that the invention costs may be sunk costs
at the time the standard is selected. Regardless of whether the costs have
already been incurred, the purpose of the monopoly pricing, and the
consequent deadweight loss, made possible by the patent monopoly is to
compensate the patentee for its costs.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 54-68.

81. One might take the view that the patent incentive is too low, so that
any additional opportunity for royalty payments will provide a social benefit.
To justify royalty payments for the benefits of standardization, however,
would require some analysis of why additional payments are particularly
desirable in the standards context, and why the extra royalties in the
standards context are likely to provide the correct additional compensation.
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III. THE INCENTIVES OF PATENTEES AND
STANDARD-SETTERS
Teece and Sherry also suggest that standard-setting
organizations, or their members, may have incentives that are
as distorted as those of patentees.8 2 The concern most often
expressed in this area is that a patentee may seek to extract
royalties greater than it is due, by keeping the existence of its
patent secret until a standard-setting organization has
committed to a standard that incorporates the patented
invention. 83 Teece and Sherry point out that it is also the case
that the members of a standard-setting organization may seek
to force a patentee to accept royalties lower than it is owed by
84
joining together to negotiate.
My previous article proposed an approach to addressing
this problem.8 5 The standard-setting organization, like the
patentee, can be viewed as the creator of a valuable intellectual
asset, the standard. 86 As such, when engaged in negotiations
with a patentee, the organization can be viewed as negotiating
on behalf of the standard, rather than on behalf of its members.
The organization's role is then analogous to that of the
patentee, which is generally viewed as negotiating on behalf of
the patent, rather than on behalf of its licensees.
From this perspective, the organization's conduct is no
more the product of collective action subject to antitrust
scrutiny than is the patentee's. Moreover, in this context it is
not significant that the standard-setting organization may not
be able to receive a patent on its intellectual contribution. The
antitrust analysis, unlike a patent infringement analysis, is not
constrained by statutory requirements regarding inventorship
and obviousness. 87 As long as the creation of the standard is
economically analogous to the creation of the patentee's
invention, antitrust could reasonably view the organization's
activities as unilateral. 88
82.
83.
84.
85.

Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1931-34.
See Mueller, supra note 2, at 907-15.
Teece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1955-57.
Patterson, supra note 6, at 1078-80 (suggesting that the members of

the standard-setting organization be treated as a single entity for negotiation
purposes).
86. David Friedman has made this argument more generally. Friedman,

supra note 37, at 1119-24.
87.
88.

See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
Cf. David A. Balto & Daniel I. Prywes, Standard-SettingDisputes: The
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This position calls into question the allegation in Sony
Electronics, Inc. v. Soundview Technologies, Inc.8 9 that the
members of a standard-setting organization conspired to refuse
to purchase a license for a patent needed to comply with a
standard. 90
The challenged actions in that case were
coordinated through the standard-setting organization, and
they appeared to be directed solely toward enabling compliance
with the standard. 91 Hence, although the court refused to
dismiss the antitrust claims, holding that the patentee properly
alleged a conspiracy to drive down license fees, 92 the members
of the organization might better have been viewed as
vindicating the interests of the standard itself, rather than
their own interests independent of the standard.
That is not to say, of course, that there is no possibility of
collusive activity. It is certainly possible that the members of a
standard-setting organization could use this sort of approach to
reduce licensing fees. My previous article proposed to control
this possibility through a test that examined whether the
93
organization's activities had made a valuable contribution.
There appears to be no evidence, however, that this has
occurred. Moreover, so long as whatever arrangements the
standard-setting organization negotiates are applicable only for
sales of products that comply with its standard, the members of
the organization are still competitors in other respects.
Putting aside the concern about collusion, one might
nonetheless be concerned about the lowering of the patentee's
royalties in the negotiation process. For that to be a valid
concern, though, one would have to be confident that the
patentee was objectively entitled to a particular level of
Need

for

Guidelines,

at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelproperty

comments/baltoprywes.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) (arguing that the
members of standard-setting organizations should be permitted to jointly
negotiate with patentees, so long as the resulting terms do not advantage any
participants in the process).
89. 157 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182 (D. Conn. 2001).
90. Id. at 182.
91. See id. at 181-82.
92. Id. at 184-90.
93. Patterson, supra note 6, at 1079-80. The European Commission's
block exemption for research and development agreements uses a similar test,
allowing the exemption for joint exploitation of research results only when
they "substantially contribute to technical or economic progress." Commission
Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development
agreements, art. 3(4), 2000 O.J. (L 304) 7, 10.
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Once one recognizes that the standard-setting
royalties.
organization also has some economic, if not legal, entitlement
to a reward, and that its negotiation with the patentee will
determine how the total amount available will be allocated
between them, 94 it is not at all clear that the patentee is
entitled to whatever royalties it would get in individual
negotiations with the members of the organization.
CONCLUSION
The creation of an industry standard is a process that has
much in common with the creation of a patented invention.
Indeed, if standards are not patentable, it is only because of
certain doctrinal peculiarities of patent law. It is therefore
important to preserve the incentives for organizations to incur
the costs of standard-setting activity, so that society may gain
the benefits of the resulting standards. The law can preserve
those incentives by treating the contributions of industry
standards as distinct from those of inventions that are
incorporated in them. More specifically, antitrust law should
ensure that the patentees of inventions incorporated in
industry standards do not extract royalties that go beyond the
value of the inventions to include the value of standardization.

94. See supra text accompanying notes 45-68.
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